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ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE PRESENTED A WEAK CASE AT TRIAL,
As a portion of each of its arguments, the State points out

that errors such as are claimed in the case at bar would be more
likely to result in a reversal without the exceptional strength
of the state's case.

This argument is misleading because, while

the law is clear that it is more difficult to find prejudicial
error in strong cases, the State's case was not strong.

With

respect to the elements of the crime charged, the State's case is
based on the testimony of Melva Palmasano, an unreliable witness.
The record clearly demonstrates that there were a number of
reasons to doubt the testimony of Ms. Palmasano.

Without the

four prejudicial incidents which were observed by the jury in
this case, defendant could well have been acquitted.

The

following examples from the transcript of the trial demonstrate
why without the prejudicial incidents the jury may not have
believed Ms. Palmasano's testimony.
Without being approached by officers, Ms. Palmasano
instigated the alleged transaction with defendant, and asked the
defendant to supply her with some methamphetamine. Tr. at 195.
At this time, Ms. Palmasano was facing a 3rd degree felony
charge for distribution of a controlled substance.
196.

Tr. at 195,

Ms. Palmasano used her own money to allegedly purchase the

marijuana in question.

Tr. at 209.

Mr. Palmasano admitted

having had marijuana in her home, and that she was a marijuana
1

user.

Tr. at 217, 218.

Sheriffs deputies did not conduct a

search of Ms. Palmasano or her premises prior to the alleged
transaction.

Tr. at 167.

The officer monitoring the alleged

transaction did not hear a drug transaction. Tr. at 151.

Ms.

Palmasano admitted under oath that on another occasion she lied
to the very officers who were involved in this case. Tr. at 223,
244.

Mrs. Palmasano was paid $2500.00 for her role in this

transaction.

Tr. at 214.

Ms. Palmasano's felony charges were

dismissed as a result of her participation in this incident.
Based on these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that
Ms. Palmasano faked the drug transaction, (the deputies
monitoring the conversation did not hear a drug transaction,)
supplied the marijuana from her personal supply (Ms. Palmasano
admitted having had marijuana in her home,) and accused
defendant.

Considering these weaknesses regarding the State's

sole witness to the alleged transaction, the characterization by
the State that this is a strong case is in error.

Considering

these weaknesses, it is highly probable that absent the
incidences of error the jury could have reached a different
result.

The errors both singly and cumulatively must therefore

be classified as harmful.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Dunn, as follows:
. . . . Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse
only if "the cumulative effect of the several errors
undermines our confidence. . . that a fair trial was had.11
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp. 801 P.2d 920, 928
(Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1146
(Utah 1989); State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987);
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986).
2

850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993).

Given the weaknesses in the

State's case, it is very probable that the jury could have
reached a different result absent the multiplicity of errors.
II.

THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
In its brief, the State argues that the statement which the

prosecutor made in his opening statement regarding bringing drugs
from California was not error.
argument.

The State has two bases for this

The first is that the statement simply set forth what

the prosecutor believed would be admissible evidence.

The

second is that while defendant objected to the statement by the
prosecutor, there was no objection to the introduction of the
actual testimony.

Both arguments are in error.

There is no basis for the argument that the prosecution
believed that information regarding the purpose of the trip to
California would be admissible.

While it makes sense to tell the

jury for foundational purposes that the defendant was planning a
trip to California and needed Ms. Palmasano to cover a shift for
her, there was no purpose foundational or otherwise to refer to a
supposed intent on the part of the defendant to purchase illegal
drugs.
jury.

The only purpose for this statement is to inflame the
The State could have laid adequate foundation to put its

case on without waving these supposed bad acts in front of the
jury.
In an opening statement, the prosecutor commits error when
he refers to matters which are not proper for the jury to
consider in reaching its verdict.
3

Although we give counsel considerable latitude in making
arguments to the jury, "counsel exceeds the bounds of this
discretion and commits error if he or she calls to the
jury's attention material that the jury would not be
justified in considering in reaching its verdict."
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah, 1993).

Contrary to the

State's argument, the statement of the prosecutor was not proper
for consideration by the jury in making its determinations and
was, therefore, error.
The State's argument regarding failure to object to the
actual testimony about the California trip is also incorrect.
When the prosecution first mentioned the California trip during
opening statement, defense counsel properly objected.

The court

allowed the statement and ruled prospectively allowing admission
of actual testimony concerning the conversation.
The Court: Motion is denied. Bring the jury back in.
away from the California Trip except only as to the
conversation.

Stay

Tr. at 91.
In this ruling the trial court allowed the State to go into the
conversation about the California trip.

The only thing this

ruling excluded was evidence about whether the trip actually took
place.

Objection was properly made by defense counsel, and

overruled by the court.
The testimony that the defendant was going to California to
purchase illegal drugs was extremely prejudicial, had no
probative value, and constituted reversible error.
III. THE ORDER TO STRIKE DID NOT EXPUNGE THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT
OF OFFICER TOMPKINS' REMARK.
In its brief, the State argues that the trial court's order
4

to strike did away with any prejudice which could have been
created by Officer Tompkins' remark.

The remark is as follows:

She [Palmasano] said that she had been trying to stay off
from drugs for I believe she said two or three weeks. Donna
was a friend of hers and knew this. That Donna was still
using drugs and trying to get her to use drugs and that
upset her. She also stated that she [defendant] was selling
drugs to kids that were her kid's age. She [Palmasano]
didn't think that was right. Basically those were the two
main issues with Mrs. Palmasano. (Tr. May 4, 1994 at 135) .
The State supports its argument that the order to strike expunged
any prejudice by referring to State v. Archuletta, 850 P.2d 1242
(Utah 1993) .

In Archuletta', a witness unexpectedly made a

statement that the defendant was wearing a knife scabbard on the
night of the murder.

Rather than granting a mistrial the trial

court ordered the statement stricken.

The court also stated that

the statement was not credible.
The Archuletta holding is not applicable in the case at bar.
In Archuletta, the testimony about the knife was confusing to the
jury at best.

There was no supporting evidence that the

defendant had a knife on the evening in question.
not killed with a knife.

The victim was

All of the evidence regarding any use

of a knife pointed to another defendant in the case.
Archuletta the State had a very strong case.

Also, in

Which the State is

lacking in the case at bar despite its arguments.
In the case at bar, Officer Tompkins' statement was
extremely prejudicial.

The statement alleged without evidence of

any kind that the defendant sold drugs on other occasions, and
sold them to children.

Without question such a statement is

certain to raise the passions of a jury regardless of the Court's
5

subsequent instruction to strike the statement.

Once uttered to

the jury, the damage is done and the jury is infected with
prejudice.
The State argues that the defendant has provided no evidence
to rebut the presumption that juries obey court instructions.
Absent a voluntary statement from a juror such evidence is
impossible to obtain.

Arguably, reality is that a direction to

the jury to strike a statement which is frequently then repeated,
only serves to effectively emphasize improper evidence to the
jury rather than cause them to ignore a statement which has
already prejudiced their view.

People passionately dislike

defendants who allegedly sell drugs to children.
IV.

THE IMPROPER REFERENCE TO THE TRANSCRIPT OF A TAPE
CONSTITUTED A PREJUDICIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATION.
In its brief the State argues that reference to the

transcript of the tape constituted neither a discovery violation
nor reversible error.

The reference to the transcript is a

violation of the discovery request.
Before trial the State received a request for discovery
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
State voluntarily complied. R. at 11.

The

Defense counsel later

confirmed by fax and telephone that no tapes were to be used.
Tr. at 150.

Copies of the transcript were handed out to counsel

just prior to the lunch break.

Tr. at 150.

The nondisclosure of the tapes and transcript occurred
despite the fact that a Rule 16 motion would have required full
disclosure of the materials.

Tr. at 150.
6

Regarding

nondisclosure of materials in a voluntary response to a request
for discovery the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
. . . However, when the prosecution chooses to respond
voluntarily to a request under subsection (a)(5) without
requiring the defense to obtain a court order,
considerations of fairness require that the prosecution
respond to the request in a manner that will not be
misleading. Therefore, we articulate two requirements that
the prosecution must meet when it responds voluntarily to a
request for discovery, First, the prosecution either must
produce all of the material requested or must identify
explicitly those portions of the request with respect to
which no responsive material will be provided. Second, when
the prosecution agrees to produce any of the material
requested, it must continue to disclose such material on an
ongoing basis to the defense. Therefore, if the prosecution
agrees to produce certain specified material and it later
comes into possession of additional material that falls
within that same specification, it has to produce the afteracquired material.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
The trial court recognized that the reference to the
transcript and tape constituted a discovery violation which was
prejudicial to the defendant.

Tr. at 153.

The State's argument that the reference to the tape and
transcript was not harmful or prejudicial is incorrect.

Because

the tape and transcript were raised before the jury and not
stricken, the jury was left to speculate on their content.

This

is especially harmful because the officer did not hear a drug
transaction on the tape.

Tr. at 151.

The jury was left to

speculate on the content of a conversation which was never heard.
Where there are wrongful discovery violations the State has
the burden of proving that the violation as not prejudicial.
In State v. Knight, the Court stated:
Because of the difficulties posed by the record's silence in
7

cases involving a wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory
evidence, it seems appropriate in such instances to place
the burden on the State to persuade a court that the error
did not unfairly prejudice the defense. Therefore when the
defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's
errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the State to
persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood
that absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been
more favorable for the defendant.
734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
Under this standard set forth in Knight, the State has the burden
of persuading the court that there was no prejudice.

If this

were a strong case based on credible witnesses supported by a
tape of the alleged drug transaction, the State would have no
difficulty in meeting its burden.

In the case at bar, the State

cannot demonstrate that the error was not prejudicial, and
reversal is, therefore, warranted.
V.

MELVA PALMASANO'S INCORRECT STATEMENT THAT DEFENDANT HAD
PREVIOUSLY BEEN ARRESTED FOR SELLING DRUGS IS PREJUDICIAL
AND HARMFUL.
During Direct examination, Melva Palmasano testified that

defendant and her husband had all been charged with selling drugs
previously, and that defendant and her husband were continuing to
sell.

Tr. at 196-197.

There was also an inference that

defendant and her husband had previously been arrested.
196-197.

Tr. at

This statement, besides being prejudicial, was untrue

as defendant had never previously been arrested.

Tr. at 197.

The State argues that this was simply an inadvertent
comment, harmless when compared with the overall strength of the
State's case.
was not strong.

Despite the State's repeated argument, the case
It is based solely on the testimony of an
8

admitted drug dealer who was not searched prior to the alleged
transaction.

The officers monitoring the alleged transaction did

not hear a drug deal.

In light of these and the other weaknesses

set forth above, the position that this is a strong case is mere
puffing.
In its brief, the State does not argue that this statement
was not prejudicial, only that it was not harmful.
must, therefore, be presumed.

The prejudice

The issue before the court is

whether the errors were harmful.

Harmless errors are properly

preserved and challenged errors that "are sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings."

State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 39 (Utah

1989) .
In many ways this case is similar to State v. Emmett, 83 9
P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).

In Emmett, there were multiple errors, and

a conviction based on the testimony of a single witness with
questionable reliability.

Regarding the errors which occurred in

that case the Court stated:
Alone, this error may have been harmless. However, viewed
in conjunction with the prosecutor's improper argument, the
fact that the evidence in favor of guilt was not strong, and
the fact that these errors impacted Emmett's credibility and
character, which were at the heart of his defense -- there
is a reasonable likelihood that absent the errors a
different result would have occurred. We therefore decline
to accept the reasoning of the trial court that it was led
into error by defense counsel's choice of trial strategy or
that the error was simply harmless. Rather, we conclude
that the error was of sufficient magnitude as to warrant a
new trial.
839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).
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Like Emmett, the irregularities in this case require reversal and
remand.
CONCLUSION
Examination of the record clearly demonstrates that the
State's case at trial was based entirely on the testimony of an
unreliable witness.

This witness had the motive and the

opportunity to fabricate the case against defendant.
In this matter there were four separate incidents of error,
and for motions for mistrial were argued and denied by the trial
judge.

Each incident alone was sufficiently prejudicial to

require reversal.

Cumulatively, the effect of the errors

undermines any confidence in the verdict and therefore requires
reversal and remand.
DATED this 34^ day of Jun<3, 1995.
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C.

BY:
DONALD E. McCAND&£§.
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER
Attorneys for Defendant
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